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TAKING PLANTINGA SERIOUSLY: 
ADVICE TO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS 
Merold Westphal 
Part of a symposium on the fifteenth anniversary of Al Plantinga's "Advice to 
Christian Philosophers," this essay reflects briefly on the current status of 
Christian philosophy. Then, in the light of three reminders from Plantinga, it 
suggests that Christian philosophers pay more attention to their other audi-
ence, the church, that they reflect on the ways in which their situation is similar 
to that of feminist philosophers, and that they seek to transcend not only the 
foundationalism and evidentialism of modernity, but also to go beyond its 
monological concept of reason to a dialogical concept. Finally, and at greater 
length, it suggests that Christian philosophers abandon the widespread 
assumption that the coin of their realm is propositions, assuming too easily 
that we have already transcended Plato's cave when we start our work. The 
bearing of this issue on the realism/anti-realism debate and on the relation of 
metaphysics to both politics and spirituality is explored. 
Looking back from the eighties to the forties and fifties, Al Plantinga, in 
his Notre Dame inaugural address, described how "deeply non-
Christian" was the philosophical mainstream in the English speaking 
world. "Few establishment philosophers were Christian; even fewer 
were willing to admit in public that they were, and still fewer thought of 
their being Christian as making a real difference to their practice as 
philosophers" (253).1 Noting the change that had occurred in three or 
three and a half decades, he noted that there were in 1983 "many more 
Christians and many more unabashed Christians in the professional 
mainstream of American philosophical life" (253). I assume that by 
"unabashed" Christian philosophers he means those who were both 
willing to admit they were Christian and who thought that their being 
so made a difference to their philosophical practice. 
The change over the past fifteen years has not been nearly so dramat-
ic. Yet it has been real, and I think no careful observer would deny that 
we live in a renaissance of unabashed Christian philosophizing. 
Unfriendly observers might be tempted, in the words of that great meta-
physician, Howard Cosell, to complain about a "veritable plethora" of 
Christian philosophers on the scene. I did hear one Jewish philosopher 
complain about the "Christian mafia" in the AP A. I think we should we 
should take that comment both as a warning against tendencies toward 
triumphalist attitudes (remembering how frequently throughout history 
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groups that gain a measure of recognition and power after being sup-
pressed or oppressed misuse their new status) and as a compliment. 
The presence of Christian philosophers in positions of leadership and 
responsibility in the APA, both at the divisional and national levels, is 
one, but only one sign of the vitality of Christian philosophizing today. 
I, for one, am grateful to God for this flourishing. But I would also like 
to use this occasion to express my gratitude to two quite extraordinary 
servants of God to whom all of us in the Society of Christian 
Philosophers are indebted. One is Al Plantinga. The combination of his 
"Advice to Christian Philosophers" and the way he has served as a role 
model of what it would be like to follow that advice, has played a crucial 
role in getting us to where we are today. The other is Art Holmes. The 
annual Wheaton College Philosophy Conference, whose moving spirit he 
was for decades, was probably the most important single precursor of 
our Society, the place where Christian philosophers from all over could 
gather together to encourage and exhort one another in Christian philos-
ophizing by simply doing it. (It is Art, by the way, whose willingness to 
speak of Christian philosophers but not of Christian philosophy, as if 
some system or style had a unique privilege from the standpoint of faith, 
is responsible for my avoiding the term 'Christian philosophy' and using 
the less than elegant phrase, 'Christian philosophizing', in its place.) 
In singling out two of our leaders for special mention, I do not in the 
least intend to slight the invaluable contributions of so many others. As 
they say in post-game interviews, "It was a real team effort." 
But that sort of past tense talk is not appropriate for us, if for no other 
reason than that the game is not over. I am glad for this opportunity to 
look back in gratitude for what had happened by 1983 and what has hap-
pened in the decade and a half since then. But surely this is even more 
importantly a time to look forward and to ask how we can best build on 
the foundation that has been laid, on the inheritance we have received. 
For the tasks of the Christian philosopher are never finished in this life. 
So I, too, shall offer some advice to Christian philosophers, including 
myself. Put in its most general terms, it is that we look back at AI's advice 
from 1983 and try to take it even more seriously than we have. I refer to 
two reminders and an exhortation. First, there is the reminder that we 
belong to the church as well as to the academy. Second comes the 
reminder that by virtue of the former affiliation we have our own agenda 
(255) and our own assumptions (256). Finally there is the exhortation to 
greater autonomy vis-a-vis other agendas and assumptions, greater "inte-
grality" in relation to our own, and greater courage, boldness, strength, 
and self-confidence in pursuing this autonomy and this integrality (254). 
Three observations to begin with. First, what I call the two hats thesis 
suggests that we have two audiences as well as two allegiances. We are 
the philosophers of the Christian community. But most members of the 
church are not members of the academy; and that suggests that we may 
need to become more popular and less technical in some of our writing. 
Taking Dewey or Emerson as our models rather than, say, Quine or 
Husserl, we may need to reach out to a wider audience more frequently 
than we are accustomed to doing. And perhaps we need to do this in 
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cooperation with one another. Beyond the occasional essay or even 
monograph we write for an audience outside the guild, we might think 
about joint volumes or conferences aimed both at bringing our expertise 
to bear on issues we think the church should be thinking about and at 
learning from the wider church what topics we should be addressing. 
Needless to say, in making this suggestion I am not advocating that 
we abandon our responsibilities and our opportunities within the acade-
my and its often esoteric languages, though even there I think we should 
be known for our lucidity and not our density. "Behold how they love 
one another" might have as a corollary, "Behold how they love their 
readers," which, being translated, is, "Behold how accessibly they write 
(within the limits of the subject matter)." 
Second, r cannot omit noting the formal similarity between AI's call 
for greater autonomy, integrality, and self-confidence and the advice 
given to feminist philosophers by their leaders. I think we would do 
well to think a bit about the ways in which, at this stage of the game, the 
community of feminist philosophers and the community of Christian 
philosophers are similar and different, recognizing, of course, that some 
individuals are members of both. A woman with official responsibilities 
in the American Academy of Religion once complained to me that the 
hardest part of the job was dealing with the evangelicals and the femi-
nists, adding that the meetings of the latter group often seemed to her 
more like camp meetings than anything else. 
Third, Plantinga writes that "the Christian philosopher has a perfect 
right to the point of view and pre-philosophical assumptions he brings 
to philosophic work; the fact that these are not widely shared outside 
the Christian or theistic community is interesting but fundamentally 
irrelevant" (256). Paraphrasing Richard Nixon's "We're all Keynesians 
now," I am tempted to respond, "We are all Gadamerians now." Not 
that Planting a derived his insight from Gadamer's attack on the preju-
dice against prejudice (pre-judgment), or that he should do penance for 
failing to do so - no, the point is rather that the sea change signified, 
however imprecisely, by talk abou t the collapse of foundationalism or of 
the Enlightenment project, means that in the abandonment of the ideal 
of philosophy as presuppositionless science, philosophers from "analyt-
ic", "continental", and American pragmatist traditions, have more com-
mon ground than their vocabularies or habits of reading and conversa-
tion might suggest. No doubt philosophical ecumenism is no more easi-
ly achieved than its ecclesiastical counterpart, but perhaps the possibili-
ties are greater now than they have been for a long time. 
Now that the search for truth "after Babel" has replaced the presump-
tion of "the view from nowhere," we can be more honest and less guilty 
about the fact that our transcendental egos are quite concrete, quite par-
ticular, quite laden with presuppositions derived from our belonging to 
various traditions. But it does not follow that it is "fundamentally irrele-
vant" that our assumptions "are not widely shared outside the Christian 
or theistic community ... " This fact may be irrelevant as to where we 
begin, but not to how we proceed. For the change that no longer 
requires us to check our concrete identities at the door in order to pre-
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tend to be impersonal thinking machines means we may have to rethink 
the nature of philosophical dialogue with those whose starting points 
are diametrically opposed to our own. If we cannot presuppose neutral 
common ground and if method is reduced to something like the search 
for reflective equilibrium, what are the implications of this for conversa-
tions that do not begin with a fairly broad overlapping consensus? In 
what ways and to what degree does the emphasis shift from the logic of 
debate to its ethics and even its rhetoric? 
We will need to go beyond insisting on our right to be ourselves, as 
fundamental and indispensable as that is, to fresh reflection about the 
possibilities and the proprieties of debating with those who are very dif-
ferent from ourselves. Whether or not we like what Habermas, or 
Gadamer, or MacIntyre, or Rorty, for example, have said about these 
matters, we will need to join this conversation about the possibilities and 
proprieties of conversation. This will mean going beyond questions of 
deontological rationality, warrant, entitlement, and the like, which for 
the most part presuppose a mono logical conception of reason, to a more 
dialogical interpretation of reason. Otherwise we may be subject to 
something like the objection raised by an unsympathetic observer of an 
increasingly influential circle of British philosopher-theologians. He 
recently said to me, "They think the collapse of foundationalism is just 
an excuse to go on being conservative!" 
I want now to look more closely at a crucial claim Plantinga makes 
just before insisting that we have a perfect right to our own pre-philo-
sophical assumptions. The Christian philosopher, he tells us, "has his 
own topics and projects to think about; and when he thinks about the 
topics of current concern in the broader philosophical world, he will 
think about them in his own way, which may be a different way. He may 
have to reject certain currently fashionable assumptions about the philo-
sophic enterprise-he may have to reject widely accepted assumptions 
as to what are the proper starting points and procedures for philosophi-
cal endeavor" (256). Just as Plantinga proceeded fifteen years ago to 
address several specific themes in the light of these claims, so I want to 
suggest several reasons for Christian philosophers to part company with 
one "currently fashionable assumption about the philosophical enter-
prise." It is the belief in propositions, or, to be a bit more precise, the 
assumption that propositions are the coin of the realm in which we carry 
out our philosophical business. 
That seems like a harmless enough assumption, but the fact that it is 
rarely articulated as an assumption, and even more rarely defended, 
does not mean that questions are not begged when it is made. Whether 
this is so and whether it should be of concern to Christian philosophers 
as such is the question I wish to explore. 
Strictly speaking, propositions differ from sentences and statements 
in that the latter belong to some natural language while the former do 
not. When we say, for example, that 'It is raining' and 'Es regnet' are 
sentences in English and German, respectively, that express the same 
proposition, we make it clear that the proposition in question is neither 
in English nor in German, and not because it is in French. But this is to 
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presuppose the highly controversial philosophical claim that meaning is 
independent of language, that natural languages are externally related 
to the meanings they convey. This is a much stronger claim than the one 
that in natural languages signs (graphemes and phonemes) are arbitrari-
ly related to the meanings they signify; for meanings could easily be a 
function of the language games in which they are embedded (as 
Wittgensteinians, Heideggerians, structuralists, and post-structuralists 
agree) without disturbing the arbitrary relation of signs to meanings. 
The English word for rain could easily enough have been sain or rian. So 
the arbitrariness thesis does not entail the externality thesis. 
Nor does the latter follow from the fact that we recognize "It is rain-
ing" as a good translation of liEs regnet" and vice versa. It is a fact that 
we can translate from one natural language into another (and from one 
sentence in English to its equivalent, e.g., from 'It's raining hard' to 'It's 
pouring') and that we can discriminate better and worse translations. 
But the externality thesis and the accompanying belief that we speak the 
heavenly language of propositions is not required by those facts. They 
belong to a particular theory about translation, and a highly controver-
sial one at that. 
We should be clear that the issue here is not some nominalist anxiety 
about overpopulating the world with abstract entities. I for one have no 
such anxieties and take the types, as distinct from tokens, of both sen-
tences and statements to be abstract entities. It is just that these abstract 
entities, like the tokens to which they are internally related, belong to 
some natural language or another. Their natural habitat is the cave. 
Propositions, by contrast, are more ethereal. 
And it is just for this reason that I think Christian philosophers would 
do well to forswear the proposition presupposition. For it encourages us 
to think that at the moment we begin to philosophize, we have already 
transcended the cave and ascended to a realm where our meanings, 
untouched, as it were by human hands (read traditions, practices) have 
an unchanging stability and clarity fit for the gods of Pure Reason. For if 
our meanings are free from embeddedness in the traditions and prac-
tices that make up natural language games, why should we not think 
them free from all the contingencies and particularities that make up the 
cave. Plato, and such notable Platonists as Husserl or Russell and 
Whitehead, thought it to be no small task to escape the cave into such a 
semantic empyrean. The language game of proposition talk presuppos-
es, with Descartes, and Locke, and sense data theorists, I think, that we 
begin in the ether of Pure Meaning and that the only task is to distin-
guish true propositions from false ones. 
In addition to the reasons our secular colleagues might give for resist-
ing the temptation of this all too easy Platonism, it seems to me that 
Christian philosophers have a special reason. It consists in the impor-
tance of preserving the difference between God and ourselves, in this 
instance not confusing the human intellect with the divine. The assump-
tion that our truth is God's Truth strikes me as dangerous, both spiritu-
ally and politically, and this, it seems to me, is the claim we make when-
ever we claim to be in possession of true propositions. 
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There is a close link, I suspect, between the proposition presupposi-
tion and the assumption that Christian philosophers have a special and 
proper propensity toward realism or even that Christianity stands or 
falls with realism. Since the realist sets herself off from Kantian idealism 
and all its anti-realistic variations, she must say more than that the real is 
and is what it is independently of what and how we think. For Kant says 
that; that's what the thing in itself and the noumenal are all about. To 
distance oneself from all forms of transcendental idealism, one must also 
claim that we (sometimes) know the real as it truly is, as it is in itself, as 
it is independently of human modes of apprehension. But for the theist, 
the thing in itself, the thing as it truly is, can only be the thing as God 
sees and knows it to be. Kant knew this well, and for that reason identi-
fied the thing in itself with the thing as it would appear to a creative, 
divine intellect that knew by means of intellectual intuition. 
But this means that the (Christian) theist who wants to be a realist 
(but why?) needs to claim that we know things as God knows them. Of 
course, there will be the quantitative disclaimer. God knows many 
propositions to be true that we do not know to be true. And, of course, 
some that we think are true are in fact not. But when we do know a 
proposition to be true, that piece of our knowledge is fully on a par with 
God's knowledge of the same proposition. 
Would we not be more consistent theists if we acknowledged that 
God's thoughts are not our thoughts, not just occasionally, when we are 
ignorant or in error, but all the time - that the infinite qualitative differ-
ence between God and ourselves also means, as Kant claimed, that 
God's thought is systematically different from ours? Is not the proposi-
tion presupposition the cornerstone of the tower of Babel where we 
chant as we climb, "I will ascend into heaven ... I will be like the most 
High" (Isa. 14:13-14)? 
"But," someone may respond, "the 'propositions' we talk about are 
almost always English sentences; we speak loosely and do not mean to 
imply by our proposition talk that we have transcended the cave of sen-
tences and statements." No doubt this is often true, though where it is 
not explicitly emphasized a preoccupation with propositions stands as 
an open invitation to be taken at face value. We can easily mislead both 
our readers and ourselves. 
But even if we avoid this danger, there is another closely related dan-
ger lying nearby. If with speech act or discourse theory we speak of 
statements rather than propositions (and remember that statements are 
made with sentences in one language or another), we will be reminded 
that making assertions of fact (uttering a constative statement) is just one 
of the many things we can do with words. This will help us to remember 
that when God speaks to us we are more likely to be dealing with 
promises, warnings, commands and the like than with mere assertions 
of fact. And we will be reminded that our own God talk should not pri-
marily consist in asserting true "propositions" about God but in speak-
ing to God in prayer, in praise, in confession, in gratitude, and so forth. 
In short, the primacy of theoretical reason will be challenged, along 
with the corollary that our chief end is to collect a pocket full of true 
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propositions about God. I sometimes refer to this as the King Midas the-
ory of truth; a long chain of Christian traditions puts the point by saying 
the goal of theology is to be sapientia and not merely scientia, that meta-
physics must always be in the service of spirituality. One of the dangers 
of proposition talk, even when it is not the babelian claim to have tran-
scended the cave, is that it encourages us to focus our attention too nar-
rowlyon asserting facts, on theoretical reason, on scientia. 
Philosophers have not always been to blame, by any means, for the 
times when the church has allowed the quest for orthodoxy to be sepa-
rated from the quest for orthopraxy, at the expense of the latter. But it 
seems to me that as the philosophers of the Christian church, we should 
resist the assumptions and practices of our guild when they encourage 
us to be part of the problem rather than a thoughtful resistance to it. 
Even as classical foundationalism and evidentialism bite the dust, we 
may need to be more autonomous vis-a-vis the theoretical bias derived, 
not from biblical faith but from modern science and the epistemological 
preoccupations of modern philosophy. 
Closely related to this problem is another, one which contributes to 
both of the problems already mentioned: the tendency to marginalize 
practical reason in relation to theoretical reason and the tendency, embod-
ied in anti-anti-realism, to overvalue our theoretical achievements in rela-
tion to the divine knowledge that for theists is the measure of Truth. (Of 
course, there can be truth which falls short of God's knowledge, but Kant 
acknowledges that!) Proposition talk suggests that the unit of meaning is 
not the term but the judgment, whether we call the judgment a sentence, a 
statement, or a proposition. But is not this too atomistic a theory of mean-
ing? Is this not to deny or ignore a double embeddedness of our sen-
tences and statements that calls for a double holism? 
First there is semantic holism. Just as terms do not mean by them-
selves but only in the context of judgments, so judgments do not mean 
by themselves but only in the context of the networks and systems of 
judgments to which they belong. When Quine, drawing on Carnap and 
Duhem, insists that "our statements about the external world face the 
tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate 
body"2 one chief reason is that they have the meaning they have "not 
individually but only as a corporate body." 
The attempt to defend realism in the face of theism depends, as 
described above, on a semantic atomism that assumes we can deal with 
"propositions" one at a time and in isolation from each other. Semantic 
holism makes it easier to see how our thoughts are not God's thoughts but 
differ wholesale, if for no other reason than that, as theistic realists readily 
admit, God sees the whole picture while we do not. So our meanings can-
not be the same as God's, and a fortiori, neither can our knowledge. 
But there is a practical or pragmatic holism that takes us beyond this 
merely semantic holism. Our judgments are not only embedded in 
chains and chiasms of other judgments; they are embedded in the prac-
tices that make up the various language games we play. If merely 
semantic holism calls attention to the contingency, particularity, and 
irreducible plurality of our natural languages and, a fortiori, of the con-
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ceptual schemes or paradigms we construct within them, practical or 
pragmatic holism makes even clearer how deeply, yes, even essentially 
we are cave-men-and-women. 
For the Christian to acknowledge this double embeddedness of our 
meanings in one or another cave culture is to adopt a theistic anti-realism 
in place of the realism that claims we can know things as they really are, 
that is, as God knows them. Just as Aristotle insists against Plato that our 
souls are essentially embodied (and not divine), so pragmatic holism 
insists, against Platonic semantics, that our meanings are essentially 
embedded (and not divine). Christian thinkers often prefer the externality 
thesis to the embeddedness thesis out of fear of the historical relativism 
implicit in semantic-pragmatic holism. But it seems to me that we are com-
mitted to the claim that only God is absolute and that everything else is rel-
ative. So if one way our knowledge turns out to be finite is that it is rela-
tive, first to our being in the cave to begin with and then to our more spe-
cific location within the cave, that is not a discovery to be refuted in the 
name of faith. Here it is not that as Christians we have a "perfect right" to 
our own "pre-philosophical assumptions," even when this means we 
"may have to reject certain currently fashionable assumptions about the 
philosophic enterprise" (256); in this case we may well have a perfect duty 
to reject the currently fashionable assumption that the human intellect (at 
its best) is the highest standard of truth, even if we are so deeply embed-
ded in the philosophical culture of our times (the latest footnotes to Plato) 
that the assumption in question is embedded in our philosophical muscles. 
If I seem to dwell on the realism/ anti-realism issue it is because I 
remain deeply puzzled why some of the finest Christian philosophers 
remain so deeply committed to realism. It is not because I think that is 
the most important issue raised by holistic resistance to proposition talk. 
For I take the challenge to the primacy of theoretical reason to be even 
more important. Pragmatic holism calls attention to the embeddedness 
of our meanings and truths not only at the point of input but also at the 
point of output. By that I mean that practices not only playa constitu-
tive role in generating our meanings and truths, but that our cognitions 
feed back into our practices as well. When, in our preoccupation with 
propositions, we abstract from the role of practices in forming beliefs, 
we are all too likely at the same time to abstract from the role of beliefs 
in shaping practices (and attitudes or emotions as well-the correlate to 
practices in an Aristotelian ethics of embedded persons). 
One way to express the change which AI's inaugural lecture served 
both to express and to evoke, is to say that for Christian philosophers, 
the gap between philosophy and theology has been dramatically 
reduced, or perhaps deliberately fuzzied. What I am suggesting is that, 
building on this substantial accomplishment, which puts us back in 
touch with a variety of premodern traditions, we need to close the gap 
between metaphysics and spirituality and between metaphysics and 
politics. There has been no shortage of work in metaphysics by 
Christian philosophers, seeking to spell out as carefully as possible the 
picture of reality presupposed by Christian faith. But it seems to me that 
this has primarily been metaphysics as speculative theory. I am not sug-
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gesting that now we turn to the task of applying our metaphysical dis-
coveries to practical life but rather adumbrating a different way of doing 
metaphysics, one in which metaphysical reflection grows so directly out 
of practices of prayer and public action that the language of applying 
true beliefs to right practices will seem quite inept for describing the 
relation of reflection to action and attitude. 
In drawing the distinction between spirituality and politics as two 
modes of practice, I do not mean to suggest the difference between 
inwardness and outwardness. There is, of course, a personal and private 
dimension to any true Christian spirituality, but there is also a public 
dimension in liturgy and worship. In calling for a Christian philosophiz-
ing more overtly oriented toward practice in these senses, I am suggesting 
a priestly role for the philosopher. Correspondingly, in calling for a 
Christian philosophizing more overtly oriented toward political practice, 
in the broadest sense of the term, I am suggesting a prophetic role (and 
most assuredly not calling for philosopher kings). I am not suggesting 
that there is something inappropriate about the role of philosopher as 
apologist, only that we have other tasks we ought not to neglect. 
For example, at present I am trying to think through the appropriate 
correlation between transcendence and self-transcendence. In other 
words, I am trying to rethink the meaning of divine transcendence by 
seeing what forms of human self-transcendence are essentially linked to 
it, the ways in which God's transcendence manifests itself in calling and 
leading us away from our natural preoccupation with ourselves, indi-
vidual and corporate. My working assumption is that the practices of 
divine transcendence will go beyond the prayer, Lord T thank Thee that I 
am not a pantheist. I do not offer this work as a model, but only as a 
hint; for it is neither complete, nor, if it were, would I presume to offer it 
as a model. 
But there are models from whom we can learn. In bringing meta-
physics into closer touch with spirituality, there is a variety of traditions 
on which to draw, patristic, A ugustinian, Franciscan, and even, if I may 
say so, Kierkegaardian. And, in seeking to link our God talk to public 
practices in society at large, we might do well to pay more attention to 
the liberation thinkers of our time. Perhaps, by God's grace, we might 
even be able to develop new models. 
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